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HOW THE ALI CHILD CUSTODY PRINCIPLES HELP ELIMINATE
GENDER AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION BIAS FROM CHILD
CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS
KATHY T. GRAHAM*

I. INTRODUCTION
For many years, the law has resolved the issue of child custody at divorce
or separation by giving one parent primary custody of the child and the other
parent visitation rights. Although a recent trend in the law has favored joint decisionmaking authority between parents post-separation, divorce has often
meant that the parent with custody would have greater decisionmaking authority for the child while the parent with visitation rights would have most of the
responsibility for child support. Most often, this has meant that the mother gets
the responsibility for custody of the child and the father gets responsibility for
supporting the child.
This commentary considers the changes proposed in the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution and the effects they will have
1
on child custody law. It also considers how gender fairness plays into child
custody determinations. The Principles begin with the notion that the parents
are the best arbiters of a parenting plan for their children after their marriage or
relationship has ended. The Principles call upon the parents to make a parenting
plan that will work for their children and the relationships in their family.
When the parents are unable to do so, the Principles provide a means for a decisionmaker to develop the parenting plan.
The parenting plan is divided into component parts of custodial responsibility and significant decisionmaking responsibility. The Principles contain an
objective formula for making each determination.
The Principles also make it much less likely that a decisionmaker will be influenced inappropriately by matters of gender. The Principles make it clear that
neither the sex of a parent, or of a child, or the sexual orientation of a parent can
be considered as factors in determining a parenting plan. The Principles also
make it possible for the decisionmaker to consider the rights of a de facto parent,
a person who may not be a legal parent but who has spent significant time raising the child, so that person has standing in the proceeding to develop the parenting plan.
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1. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2000) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES 2000]. Chapter 2 provides Principles Governing
the Allocation of Custodial and Decisionmaking Responsibility for Children.

323

GRAHAM - FMT.DOC

09/06/01 2:57 PM

324 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

Volume 8:323

2001

This commentary highlights the changes in the law that the Principles propose in order to make it more possible for parents to develop a parenting plan,
either on their own or with the help of a decisionmaker, that will be less likely to
be tainted by gender and sexual orientation bias.
II. CHILD CUSTODY LAW
A. A Brief History of Child Custody Law
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, fathers had the right
to custody of their children. Sometime during the early twentieth century when
divorce became more prevalent, many jurisdictions began to follow the so-called
“tender years presumption” which held that mothers should be favored for
custody of young children. Children needed their mothers to help nurture them
after a divorce, and mothers were favored as the physical and legal custodians
of children at divorce. During the last thirty years, all of that has changed, no
doubt in part due to the changing roles of mothers and fathers in the nurturing
2
of their children.
Custody law now provides that there is no appropriate presumption for favoring either mother or father--the law is gender neutral. At the same time, notions about who should have custody of children following divorce have also
changed. Joint custody has grown as an option in divorce that provides both
3
parents with a role in physical custody and decisionmaking post-divorce. As a
result of the decrease in popularity of laws preferring maternal custody, more
fathers are awarded custody today. Although statistics tell us that, for the most
part, the post-divorce family looks much the same as it has for fifty years (i.e.,
the mother has custody of the children) in many current cases, dad also has
4
custody of the children. The structure of the custody law has changed to accommodate the interests of both parents, but the standard by which custody is
to be determined has remained constant. Several jurisdictions focus on the primary-caretaker standard for determining custody, but most jurisdictions continue to rely on the best-interests standard in deciding which of the two parents
should have custody of the children. The Legislatures of many states have
adopted criteria for the decisionmaker to consider in determining best interests.
In many cases, these criteria include the emotional ties between the child and the
parents, the ability of a parent to cooperate with the other parent on visitation
issues, and the presence of any form of abuse. Many statutes make it clear that
the gender of a parent is not a valid factor in determining custody. Some statutes even state that the conduct, marital status, income, social environment, or

2. See generally Mary Ann Mason, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS (1994) (discussing the history of American Custody Law).
3. See generally Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, Joint Custody: Bonding and Monitoring Theories, 73 IND. L.J. 393 (1998) (discussing joint custody).
4. See Lee E. Teitelbaum, Divorce, Custody, Gender, and the Limits of Law: On Dividing the Child,
92 MICH. L. REV. 1808, 1810 (1994) (discussing the results of Maccoby and Mnookin’s research compiled in Dividing the Child).
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lifestyle of a parent may be considered if those factors may have an adverse im5
pact on the child.
A difficulty with the best-interests standard is its broadness. Even though
the decisionmaker may articulate a decision based on the appropriate facts and
factors, the broadness of the standard makes it possible for a judge to insert his
or her own biases into the process, intentionally or unintentionally. The bestinterests standard invites a decisionmaker to look at what he or she regards as in
the best interests of the children. A decisionmaker’s own moral and ethical beliefs will likely influence this decision, even when the decisionmaker believes
that they do not.
B. ALI PRINCIPLES
First, the Principles emphasize the goal of having the parents of a child cooperate to develop a parenting plan that will work for their family. The Principles also encourage the decisionmaker to accept a parent-proposed plan, unless
it is not entered into knowingly and voluntarily or it could be harmful to the
6
child.
If the parents are unable to develop their own parenting plan, the Principles
state that child caretaking responsibility is determined by focusing on how the
child has been cared for up to time that the parenting plan is needed. The Principles state that “the court should allocate custodial responsibility so that the
proportion of custodial time the child spends with each parent approximates the
proportion of time each parent spent performing care-taking functions for the
7
child prior the parents’ separation. . .” The Principles recognize that the circumstances in a particular case may be such that it would be harmful to allow the
caretaking functions to be assumed by the primary caretaker, and in those cases
different arrangements would be made. The goal is to provide an objective standard for determining caretaking responsibility that is based on the circumstances that existed before the separation and that takes the court out of the
business of making a determination of which of the two parents would create
the home that would, hypothetically, provide the child with the best circumstances. The new standard moves us from conjecture about the best placement
for the child and focuses more on the patterns of caretaking established in the
past.
The determination of decisionmaking responsibility is made separately
from the determination of caretaking responsibility. The Principles draw the
distinction between the two functions of parents associated with childrearing.
The Principles recognize that a division of labor for caretaking should follow
along the lines of how caretaking has been handled in the past. Additionally,
they recognize that for most parents, shared decisionmaking is the preferred

5. See Kathryn Mercer, The Ethics of Judicial Decision-Making Regarding Custody of Minor Children: Looking at the “Best Interests of the Child” and the “Primary Caretaker” Standards as Utility Rules, 33
IDAHO L. REV. 389 (1997) (critiquing the best-interests standard).
6. See ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 1, § 2.07 (providing that “(1) the court should order any
provision of a parenting plan agreed to by the parents unless the agreement (a) is not knowing or
voluntary, or (b) would be harmful to the child.”).
7. See id. § 2.90.
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form of decisionmaking, and unless there are special reasons to do it differently,
8
parents will share that responsibility after the parents have separated. This
method of sharing allows both parents to have continued involvement in the life
of the child; even a parent who spent little time with a child undoubtedly has
had a role to play in making decisions about the child’s welfare.
The Principles also make it clear that certain factors may not be considered
in making determinations about child custody. Such factors as the race, gender,
religious practices, sexual orientation, extramarital sexual conduct and a parent’s earning capacity are not to be taken into consideration in making a deter9
mination about a parenting plan for the child.
The other aspect of the Principles that represents a change from
well-established law is the expansion of those parties who have standing to participate in a custody proceeding. The Principles include legal parents, parents by
estoppel, de facto parents and other adults who have been allocated decision10
making responsibility under a parenting plan. This makes it possible for a
much broader group of persons to have standing to participate in the custody
proceeding. For instance, a gay parent who has helped raise the natural child of
a gay partner will have standing as a de facto parent to participate in the custody
proceeding. This is true even though there had been no adoption of the child by
the partner.
III. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PRINCIPLES FROM A GENDER-FAIRNESS PERSPECTIVE
The Principles provide the parents of a child an opportunity to work out the
details of a plan without the intervention of a third party, in this case the state.
To the extent that the parents are able to do so, the plan will not be infected with
the gender or sexual orientation biases of a third party. The parents can arrange
their lives according to what works for them and their child. In making their
plan, the parents undoubtedly will be influenced by the standards in the law
that emphasize how parents have ordered caretaking and decisionmaking responsibilities in the past. The standards are not biased in favor of either parent,
and they make it clear that the gender or sexual orientation of either parent is
not relevant to making a parenting plan.
To the extent that a parent believes that either her gender or sexual orientation, or the gender or sexual orientation of the other parent, may be relevant to
the creation of the parenting plan, the Principles discourage this belief. The Principles encourage the parents to consider childcare and decisionmaking responsibilities as functions that can be attended to by both parents equally well. Thus,
neither parent is preferred as the primary caretaker of the child in the postseparation family.
The Principles also make it much more difficult for a decisionmaker to consider the gender and sexual orientation of a parent in determining post-divorce
caretaking responsibility of parents. The facts to be considered are primarily
those that examine how caretaking was handled before the separation. Requir8. See id. § 2.10.
9. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §2.14
(Tentative Draft No. 3, Part I, 1998) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES 1998].
10. ALI PRINCIPLES 2000, supra note 1, § 2.04.
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ing a determination on the parents’ established caretaking practices gives the
decisionmaker much less discretion to determine caretaking responsibility than
under the best-interests standard.
By providing the decisionmaker with less discretion, it follows that the decisionmaker will have less opportunity to insert his or her own cultural biases
into the process. For example, the decisionmaker cannot as easily insert his or
her own biases about the appropriate role of men and women in the rearing of
children. That is not to say that bias will not play a role in decisionmaking, but
that the decision concerning the child’s best interests will be based upon a more
concrete standard of how the caretaking functions have been shared during the
child’s life, instead of upon a standard of review. To further ensure gender and
sexual orientation fairness, the Principles make it impermissible for a decisionmaker to consider factors that have been regarded as relevant to determining
custody in the past. For instance, although most statutes have excluded the tender years presumption as a basis for a custody determination and have made it
clear that there is no custody preference for either parent because of gender,
some decisionmakers have considered placement of a child with a same-sex
parent as an advantage to the child’s development. Similarly, decisionmakers
have taken the extramarital sexual relationships of a parent and the sexual orientation of a parent into account in determining child custody. The Principles
provide that the gender and sexual conduct of a parent are generally not rele11
vant to the determination of caretaking and decisionmaking responsibility.
Given the creation of objective standards that disallow gender or sexual orientation bias, one could argue this prohibition in the Principles is unnecessary. Yet, it
stands as a clear-cut articulation of a standard that promotes gender and sexual
orientation fairness.
One might argue that it does not really matter whether the standard is
changed because, in most cases, it is in the best interests of the child to have the
parent who has exercised the most significant caretaking responsibilities during
the marriage, continue to have those responsibilities after a divorce. To a great
extent, this is an accurate observation. But for those few cases where the decisionmaker will apply the best-interests standard in what appears to be a biased
and unprincipled way, the Principles will prevent such action. Perhaps the Principles cannot take all of the bias out of such a determination, but they offer a
standard that comes closer to accomplishing that goal than the best-interests
standard has done.
Most importantly, the Principles emphasize that the caretaking responsibility after divorce is determined largely by how the parties ordered caretaking responsibilities during the marriage. This sends a message to the parties that if
they are unable to agree on how caretaking responsibilities should be ordered
following their divorce, their ability to negotiate caretaking responsibility depends upon how much they have participated in these activities in the past. It
encourages the parties to focus on that variable rather than other issues related
to how either perceives the other’s effectiveness in parenting the child. This is a
much more objective standard than the more ambiguous best-interests standard,
which may have encouraged parents to continue bickering about custody be11.

Id. § 2.14.
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cause the ambiguity of the standard made it impossible to conclude who might
prevail.
Another significant aspect of the Principles from the gender fairness standpoint is that they recognize that caring for a child involves more than the
day-to-day caretaking function. It also involves the economic and other supports needed to provide a good standard of living for the caretaker and the
child. For example, parenting functions include working to support the child
and the caretaker, performing financial planning, and caring for and maintaining the family home. By separating and distinguishing caretaking functions
from parenting functions, the Principles recognize not only the contributions of
parents for the “hands-on” care of a child, but also recognize the more indirect
but still important contribution of parents in providing financial and other support for the child and the primary caretaker. This broader understanding of
parenting functions influences the determination and allocation of decisionmaking responsibilities.
The Principles provide that both parents should have a continuing role in
the rearing a child by establishing a presumption that decisionmaking responsibility should be allocated jointly so long as the parents have been sharing the
parenting functions for their child. This presumption gives both the parent who
has been working outside the home to provide for the child and the caretaking
parent an opportunity to continue in his or her decisionmaking role, and to continue being involved in the life of the child. It also recognizes gender equity in
that it encourages the continued involvement of both parents with the child after
separation.
The Principles also provide a broader definition of parent than many decisionmakers have accepted in the past. A legal parent and a de facto parent may
have standing to participate as a party in proceedings allocating responsibility
for the caretaking and decisionmaking for a child. The definition of de facto parent includes a person who has cared for a child, but does not have another le12
gally recognized connection to the child as a parent. Most notably, this definition provides a gay partner with standing to appear in a custody proceeding
even though that partner may not be recognized as a legal parent to the child. If
the partners have lived together, and one is the legal parent and the other is not,
but both have cared for and raised the child, the Principles assure the non-legal
parent an opportunity to be heard on the issues of custody.
By opening up the proceedings, the Principles encourage us to look at parenthood differently. Parenthood does not consist only of an intact nuclear family with a mother and father who are raising a child. By expanding the definition of parent, we recognize a broader concept of parent that transcends gender
or sexual orientation. Two dads, two moms, or a mom and a dad all may effectively provide for the care and nurturing of a child. This more expansive definition will encourage us all to concentrate less on the gender of a parent and
more on the care that a parent provides.

12. Id. § 2.03 (stating that a de facto parent is someone who has lived with the child for a significant period of time and with the consent of a legal parent, has performed a substantial amount of the
caretaking functions for the child).
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IV. GENDER-NEUTRAL LAWS MAY NOT HAVE GENDER-NEUTRAL IMPACTS
Making the child custody laws gender-neutral is not a new or novel concept. What the Principles do is create new standards that incorporate the genderneutral concepts that have long been a part of the law. Some would argue that
previous attempts at creating gender-neutral laws for determining child custody
have been gender-biased in the impact they have had on parents. For instance,
proponents of a change in the sole custody rule which prevailed in the l960’s
and l970’s argued that this law unfairly deprived dads of opportunities to parent
their children following divorce. Similarly, the joint custody laws caused controversy for those who believed the law favored fathers (who tended to work
more hours, at higher paying jobs with consequently with less time devoted to
caretaking of their children) at the expense of mothers (who had sacrificed more
in terms of their careers and their lives to raise their children than had fathers).
Both of these approaches to determining child custody appeared gender-neutral
and still produced unfair results, according to the opponents of the laws. Thus,
making the law appear gender neutral may not resolve the bias and prejudice
that a law has in application.
On the other hand, perhaps the express law has less impact on the child
custody determination than we might expect. In Mnookin and Maccoby’s study
of divorcing parents in California, they learned that even though California law
contains a presumption that favors joint custody, in 70 percent of the cases the
children live with their mother in an arrangement that either provides mom
with sole custody or joint legal custody, but results in mom being the primary
physical custodian of the children. This suggests that the law favoring joint
custody has not greatly impacted the living arrangements that parents make for
13
their children following the divorce. The authors conclude that “despite some
revolutionary changes in the law to eliminate gender stereotypes and to encourage greater gender equity, the characteristic roles of mothers and fathers remain
14
fundamentally different.” Yet, as Professor Teitelbaum suggests in his book
review of the Mnookin and Maccoby study, perhaps it is impossible to measure
the impact that the change in the law has had on divorcing partners in California. He states that:
it might be suggested, although cautiously—because of lack of data from an
earlier time—that the very high level of commitment to joint legal custody, the
substantial levels of expressed paternal interest in sole or joint physical custody,
and the somewhat lower but still substantial level of requests for sole or dual
physical custody by fathers do indicate a change in attitudes and behaviors that
15
is influenced by the legal context.

Ultimately, it is difficult to determine what impact a change in law has on
the behavior of those impacted by the change.
Following Mnookin and Maccoby’s approach, we may ask how the adoption of the Principles will impact the outcome of custody cases. One possible an-

13. See ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL
DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 268 (1992).
14. Id. at 271.
15. See Teitelbaum, supra note 4, at 1835.
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swer follows the conclusion posited by Mnookin and Maccoby: the law will
have little if any impact on the outcome because the determination of living and
caretaking arrangements for children is arranged by their parents in a process
that is affected very little by the law. Another possible answer is that the new
law will impact how the parties bargain for childcare responsibilities following
separation. The law that gives the caretaking parent the right to custody of the
child will give that parent more bargaining power in the process of resolving the
issue than he or she would have in a system that bases the decision on other
criteria. It may also give the primary caretaking parent more bargaining power
than he or she would have in a system that has a presumption favoring joint
custody. In addition, the research suggests that in most cases the primary caretaking parent is the mother. To the extent the law affects the bargaining process,
it will give her more power, not because she is the mom, but because she is the
person who has spent the most time performing caretaking functions and who
has sacrificed the most in her career or in other endeavors in order to provide
for her child. Of course, the law may favor the stay-at-home dad over the career
mom, and it favors both parents as joint decisionmakers if they both have performed parental functions in the past.
Thus, despite the changes made in the law by the Principles, it may be that
mothers will, in most cases, continue to have the primary caretaking role with
children after separation from fathers. Meanwhile fathers typically will have to
be satisfied with a role as joint decisionmaker and more limited rights to the
daily caretaking of a child.
So, in the end, what do the Principles do to help eliminate gender bias from
the law that is more effective than previous attempts to do so? The Principles
create a structure in the law that is more nuanced and complex and which gives
the decisionmaker an opportunity to better replicate the roles and responsibilities of both parents post-divorce. For instance, the role of a parent as caretaker
is considered, but so is the role of a parent in performing non-caretaking parental functions. All of these activities are figured into the calculation for determining who should have decisionmaking power post-separation. The third
party decisionmaker can assign a significant role for both parents post-divorce,
and can better meet the needs that both parents have to fulfill their responsibilities to their children.
By creating this new structure for the responsibility of parents
post-dissolution, the law promotes gender equity in that both parents will be regarded, to the extent possible, in the same manner that they were regarded before the separation or divorce. This structure will attempt to replicate parental
contributions as they were made before the family was transformed by separation. For instance, if the parents have lived in an arrangement in which one parent worked outside of the home and the other parent assumed most of the caretaking for the child, the parent who performed the work outside the home will
be recognized for the performance of these parenting functions. The parent in
the home will be recognized for both caretaking and parental functions performed for the child. When creating a parenting plan, the decisionmaker will
strive to create an arrangement that gives primary caretaking responsibility to
the parent who has stayed with the child, but both parents will share decisionmaking functions. This more clearly replicates how the parents have ordered
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their responsibilities during their marriage or relationship. To a great extent,
this is different from past standards that did not have the capacity to replicate
the dynamic of the family before the divorce.
The Principles encourage parents to work all of this out without the help of
another party. If the parents are unable to do that, the Principles provide a system which removes the opportunities for the third party decisionmaker to insert
his or her own biases regarding gender or sexual orientation into determinations
about custody and parental responsibilities. Additionally, the Principles provide
a more expansive definition of parent to include those who otherwise might be
omitted even though they have played a significant role in rearing a child.
If mothers continue to have primary caretaking responsibilities most of the
time, the law assures us that the assignment is based on the actual time spent
with children rather than the fact that she is the mother and not the father.
Gender bias in the law as written is not causing mothers to have custody more
often than fathers. While law establishes gender-neutral criteria, the results of
its application may not be. To the extent that the impact of this law is not gender-neutral, it sends a message to dads that if they desire a larger role in the
caretaking of a child post-separation, they must assume a greater caretaking role
16
before separation. If they do, their role will be recognized in the same way that
a father’s role is recognized.
V. CONCLUSION
The Principles take us farther along the path to a child custody law that is
focused on making custody determinations that will be the best for the child.
They do this by focusing the determination of custody on objective data related
to how the parents have provided caregiving and parenting functions for their
child. The objective standard takes the mystery out of the determination. At the
same time, the Principles provide an opportunity for both parents to be involved
in the care of their child post-separation.
Additionally, the Principles create a standard that focuses on the needs of
the child, and seeks to remove any gender or cultural bias from the decisionmaking process. To the extent that the results are skewed to favor mothers over
fathers as caretakers for children post-divorce, it is a reflection of mothers’
greater involvement in direct caretaking (as opposed to other parental functions)
before dissolution. That result is not a failing of the law as a result of gender
bias, rather it is a statement about the cultural differences in the roles of mothers
and fathers in our society.
16. See Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child
Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 773 (1988) where the author observes:
As with most gender-neutral rules, its impact may not be gender neutral . . . but
currently operate to the advantage of mothers, but, if we value nurturing behavior,
then rewarding those who nurture seems only fair. If fathers are ‘left out,’ they can
change their behavior and begin making sacrifices in their careers and devoting
their time during the marriage to the primary care and nurturing of children. Men
can exercise the same ‘free’ choice that women traditionally have in these matters,
adjusting their outside activities to care for their children. Men who choose not to
devote their time and attention to the children during the marriage but wish to care
for them after the marriage ends can bargain against the mother’s entitlement as
primary caretaker by making financial or emotional concessions at divorce.

